

5281 Given the potential importance of this book as a re-
 5282 source for researchers and for teachers, it is important to
 5283 make note of the gender breakdown of the contributing
 5284 authors. Out of 31 contributing scholars, only 3 are
 5285 women. While the field of American politics, and
 5286 legislative studies in particular, continues to have a gender
 5287 imbalance in membership, it is not as stark as the
 5288 numbers here would indicate (less than 10% female).
 5289 As recent research shows, gender imbalances in citations
 5290 (Daniel Maliniak, Ryan Powers, and Barbara F. Walter,
 5291 “The Gender Citation Gap in International Relations” in
 5292 *International Organization*, 2013) and in the construction
 5293 of syllabi (Jeff D. Colgan, “Gender Bias in IR Graduate
 5294 Education? New evidence from syllabi” in *PS: Politics and
 5295 Political Science*, forthcoming) have important ramifica-
 5296 tions for the trajectory of our field and the success of
 5297 underrepresented scholars. It is worrisome that a book that
 5298 could easily be viewed as a “go to” guide for the state of the
 5299 literature perpetuates this gender imbalance. Some efforts
 5300 to note the expertise of female political scientists has been
 5301 made in recent years (e.g., <http://womenalsoknowstuff.com>)
 5302 but it is important that those working on edited
 5303 volumes, conference organizers, and others pay attention
 5304 to the gender balance (as well as race/ethnicity, among
 5305 other underrepresented groups) when highlighting experts
 5306 in the field.

5309 Despite the notable strengths and contributions of this
 5310 volume, it suffers from some of the common weaknesses
 5311 of edited volumes as well. For instance, relatively few
 5312 chapters offer new arguments or analyses that are not
 5313 present in other published works of the contributing
 5314 authors. There are, of course, some exceptions where
 5315 chapters here appear to offer new arguments or original
 5316 analyses (e.g., Chapter 11 on the policy consequences of
 5317 polarization in the American states, and Chapter 12 on
 5318 partisan media in the 2012 election cycle). A second
 5319 weakness is that even when chapters address competing
 5320 viewpoints on a topic (e.g., mass polarization or the role
 5321 of the media), the chapters are rarely in conversation with
 5322 each other, directly addressing the arguments and evi-
 5323 dence of the other authors in this particular volume.
 5324 Rather, each addresses past work in this vein, which
 5325 sometimes leaves the authors speaking past each other
 5326 rather than being in conversation with one another.

5330 **The People’s News: Media, Politics, and the Demands**
 5331 **of Capitalism.** By Joseph E. Uscinski. New York: New York University
 5332 Press, 2014. 195p. \$79.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.
 5333 doi:10.1017/S1537592716003716

5334 — Benjamin T. Toll, *Lake Superior State University*

5336 In the 2014 movie *The Interview*, Dave Skylark (played by
 5337 James Franco) states: “It’s the first rule of journalism. You
 5338 give the people what they want!” Unfortunately, as those
 5339 who study the role of the news media in the political
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5341 process know, this quote from an otherwise forgettable
 5342 movie is all too accurate about today’s political news. In his
 5343 book, Joseph E. Uscinski focuses on understanding the
 5344 role of the capitalist market on the American news media’s
 5345 coverage of policy issues and how this ultimately detracts
 5346 from the public’s ability to learn about these issues.
 5347 Through statistical and case study analysis, he shows that
 5348 while the news media have the potential to impact great
 5349 learning and deliberation regarding politics, due to market
 5350 forces and the public’s choices they fall short of their lofty
 5351 potential. In short, *The People’s News* provides a necessary
 5352 explanation of just how thoroughly the free market
 5353 impacts the type of news that we get, and how this harms
 5354 us, even as Americans increasingly distrust the media for
 5355 giving them what they want.

5356 The main scholarly addition of this book is to disen-
 5357 tangle the problem of supply and demand in political
 5358 news. In other words, a primary question is whether
 5359 scholars ought to blame the news media for the dearth of
 5360 policy coverage, or if this blame should rest more on the
 5361 shoulders of the American public. The answer according to
 5362 Uscinski, is that even among the broadcast networks of
 5363 ABC, CBS, and NBC, it is the audience’s impact on news
 5364 that drives it away from politically informative content.

5365 The book begins with a discussion of the main theories
 5366 regarding the news media in American politics. The first
 5367 chapter looks at the structural market forces that perme-
 5368 ate the news media and how these incentives need not be
 5369 known to have an impact on how one covers politics. Yet
 5370 the news media are given greater constitutional freedom
 5371 and power, which should lead them to be above a pure-
 5372 market based model. Hence, the media have an opportu-
 5373 nity, and some would say an obligation, to provide more
 5374 than just what the public wants to hear, but subsequent
 5375 chapters of the book show this does not take place.

5376 The second chapter begins with a summary of the
 5377 history of media-effects research and moves into a broader
 5378 discussion of agenda setting and its role in the literature.
 5379 The most important component of this chapter is the
 5380 attempt to disentangle the causal mechanism of agenda-
 5381 setting research in American politics. Simply put, a cor-
 5382 relation between what the public deems as being salient
 5383 and what the news media put on television could be the
 5384 result of either the public’s interest in issues or the
 5385 stations’ privileging of some issues over others.

5386 Using data from the Vanderbilt Media Archive,
 5387 Uscinski looks at the coverage of the three main broadcast
 5388 channels over the span of 1968–2010 to determine what
 5389 type of issue coverage is driven by the public and what type
 5390 of coverage is driven by the networks themselves. He finds
 5391 that, over time, the audience is more likely to drive the
 5392 content of news than the broadcast networks are to drive
 5393 issue salience among the public. Yet there are instances in
 5394 which the news media can drive what the public thinks is
 5395 important.

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5401 Thus, the third chapter is dedicated to explaining this
5402 civic-minded journalism that can impact what the public
5403 thinks about. Although there is growing evidence that
5404 cable news networks provide ideological content to appeal
5405 to a niche audience, Uscinski uses Chapter 3 to look at
5406 the ways in which broadcast networks have changed over
5407 time. The main conclusion of this chapter is that changes
5408 in mass partisanship do influence news coverage for the
5409 following three quarters. In short, it is not only cable
5410 ^[AU7] networks that respond to the partisan inclinations of the
5411 American public.
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5413 The biggest strength of this book lies in the fourth
5414 chapter, however. Usinski moves from looking purely at
5415 broadcast networks and instead does case-study analysis
5416 of the influence of audiences on cable networks' coverage.
5417 First, he looks at how cable networks use unscientific polls
5418 as a way of gauging what audiences want to hear about
5419 specific issues. For instance, Fox News's Bill O'Reilly used
5420 online polls to help him stay on the same side as his
5421 audience over the shooting of Trayvon Martin by George
5422 Zimmerman. Yet social media now also provide the
5423 opportunity for cable networks to learn about audience
5424 views and change how issues are covered. The example
5425 provided to make this case deals with the primary victory
5426 of Christine O'Donnell over Mike Castle. Shortly after
5427 ^[AU8] this upset by the Tea Party—backed candidate, Fox News
5428 contributors Charles Krauthammer and Karl Rove called
5429 the general election a lost seat. Quickly, the audience
5430 started denouncing this tone of coverage, and the two
5431 ^[AU9] contributors started to backtrack and become more
5432 positive toward O'Donnell. This chapter, more than any
5433 other in this book, proves the real impact of the audience
5434 on news in America today.
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5436 The author makes many interesting arguments, and his
5437 book one of the few works to seriously try to explain the
5438 causal flow between news coverage and what the public
5439 thinks is salient. Usinski concludes with a discussion of
5440 ^[AU10] what the news should look like by offering seven changes
5441 to the media landscape: 1) Limit sensationalism in
5442 coverage; 2) provide more substantive and policy-oriented
5443 coverage; 3) provide higher-quality commentators rather
5444 than purely entertaining journalists; 4) displace the horse-
5445 race coverage with discussions of policy; 5) ensure that
5446 journalists are less focused on public interaction, as
5447 discussed in Chapter 4; 6) draw a brighter line between
5448 commentary and news; and 7) provide ideological parity in
5449 coverage.
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5451 These suggestions are not surprising, yet they appear to
5452 forget what the entirety of the book is about. Its very core
5453 is about understanding the impact of the capitalist
5454 consumer-driven market on news coverage, but all of
5455 the solutions are aimed at what the news ought to change
5456 about itself in order to provide better coverage for the
5457 public. These suggestions cannot solve the problem as
5458 long as one network remains interested in capitalism.
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5461 Looking simply at the success of the Fox News Channel
5462 as consistently being the second-highest-rated cable
5463 network (only ESPN beats it), one can surmise that the
5464 solutions proffered by Usinski are not what the public
5465 wants. It certainly makes sense to try and fix problems
5466 with the way that the news is done, but with the focus of
5467 the book on market forces, these solutions are less than
5468 satisfactory.
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5470 While the solutions to the problems of journalism are
5471 lacking, Usinski nicely highlights what the problems are.
5472 This book would fit very nicely into discussions of agenda
5473 setting, the economic incentive to present polarized news,
5474 and how the public impacts news coverage. In all, *The
5475 People's News* is a solid contribution to our understanding
5476 of the news media, the public, and how we discuss politics
5477 in the United States.
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5479 **Rich People's Movements: Grassroots Campaigns to**
5480 **Untax the One Percent.** By Isaac Williams Martin. New York:
5481 Oxford University Press, 2013. 304p. 31.95 cloth, 21.95 paper.
5482 doi:10.1017/S1537592716003728
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5484 — Joe Kling, *St. Lawrence University*
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5486 In his book, Isaac Williams Martin traces the twentieth-
5487 century history of antitax movements. These movements
5488 sought to redistribute resources to the wealthy by
5489 repealing the Sixteenth Amendment, passed in 1913,
5490 and legitimizing a federal income tax, or by limiting
5491 congressional authority to set tax rates, or by seeking in
5492 some way to combine these two approaches. Martin's
5493 thesis is straightforward. "Since the early twentieth cen-
5494 tury," he writes, "a small but vocal minority of Americans
5495 has fomented nonviolent rebellions . . . to demand that
5496 government redistribute resources to the rich" (p. 1). He
5497 identifies these "nonviolent rebellions" as coming out of
5498 "the grassroots libertarian right" (p. xiv), and describes in
5499 meticulous detail how members of the business classes,
5500 beginning in the 1920s, used the organizing techniques of
5501 the populists and other Progressive protest groups to create
5502 movements for the benefit of the more privileged members
5503 of American society.
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5505 *Rich People's Movements* is organized as a set of case
5506 studies, beginning in the 1920s. From that point, Martin
5507 traces the emergence of a variety of antitax movements
5508 across the twentieth century that, he argues, eventually
5509 provide the ideological and policy basis for the Tea Party
5510 movement. The introductory chapter lays out the author's
5511 framework for understanding the basic character of these
5512 movements. He finds that policy threats, including acts of
5513 Congress that increased taxes on at least some of the
5514 wealthy, "were necessary to trigger mobilization on behalf
5515 of the rich" (p. 12). Advocates for the rich turned to
5516 grassroots tactics when, in times of crisis, the usual
5517 methods of lobbying, pressure-group activity, and other
5518 "familiar channels of political representation" (p. 14) failed
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